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CASES NOTED
corporate officer of unexercised stock warrants does not come within the
definition of "sale" in Section 3(a) (14) 2 of the Act, and no action lies for
recovery of profits under Section 16(b) unless the donee is the alter-ego of
the donor. Truncale v. Blumberg, 83 F. Supp. 628 (S. D. N. Y. 1949).
Prior to enactment of federal legislation, speculation by insiders was
widely condemned. 3 Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act has as its purpose pro-
tection against short-swing speculation and profit-taking in corporate se-
curities by insiders on information gained pursuant to their close relationship
with the issuer. 4 Under this section, the insider's profit may be recovered by
the corporation irrespective of his intent.
In delimiting the definition of the term "sale," the holding in the instant
case does not seem consistent with the objective of the statute, i.e., to
prevent profits by insiders. It has been clearly demonstrated that, in certain
instances, it may well be more advantageous for the corporate insider to
forego his short term price appreciation gain in favor of an even larger
profit in the form of allowable tax deductions pursuant to gifts.5 Dismissal
of such a possibility as "fanciful" 6 and the assertion that ". . . the tax
laws would seem to have absolutely nothing to do with the question ... . "
fail to take into consideration the very real problem of continued insider
profit-taking through tax deduction rather than price appreciation. The
definition of the term "sale" in Section 3 (a) (14) of the statute itself includes
the words, "or otherwise dispose of." Other courts have given a construction
more in accord with the objectives of the governing statute. s
It is submitted that the term "sale" should be liberally construed to
include any short term transaction in securities by the insider which results
in financial gain to him. The holding in the principal case leaves a loophole
in the Act that may well serve only to defeat the very objective that it set
out to accomplish.
CORPORATE FINANCE-TRADING IN SECURITIES BY
PRODUCTION MANAGER NOT WITHIN SECTION 16 (b)
OF SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Plaintiff, a stockholder of Twentieth Century Fox-Film Corporation,
brought suit for recovery of profits realized by defendant, production manager,
2. 48 STAT. 884 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78c(a) (1946).
3. See Tracy and MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MICH.
L. REv. 1025, 1032 (1934); Comment, 32 Mlcn. L. REv. 678 (1934).
4. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (C. C. A.2d 1943); Park &
Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.Zd 984 (C. C. A.2d 1947).
5. See Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on "Revenue Revision of
1942," 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1942) ; WOaMsFR, THE THrEoRY AND PRACTIc E OF ESTATE
PLANNING 75 (1946).
6. Truncale v. Blumberg (original case), 80 F. Supp. 387, 389 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
7. Id. at 390.
8. See Moore v. Gorman, 75 F. Supp. 453 (S. D. N. Y. 1948); Schillner v. H.
Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875 (C. C. A.2d 1943).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
through sale of securities of the corporation. Plaintiff contended that de-
fendant was an officer within the meaning of Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 1 which provides that profits made by corporate
officers from sale of securities within six months after their purchase shall
inure to the corporation. Held, judgment for defendant since he was not
an officer within the meaning of the statute. Colby v. Klune, 83 F. Supp.
159 (S. D. N. Y. 1949).
Under the power conferred by Section 3(b) 2 of the Act the Securities
and Exchange Commission has defined an "officer" as a president, vice-
president, treasurer, secretary, comptroller or any other person performing
functions corresponding to those performed by the foregoing officers.3 Since
defendant was admittedly not one of those officers enumerated by the statute,
the primary question involved was whether the defendant as production
manager performed functions corresponding to those performed by officers
of the Fox Corporation. By comparing the duties imposed upon the corpora-
tion's officers by the by-laws with those performed by the defendant in his
capacity as production manager, the court found that the defendant's duties
were separate and distinct from those performed by the specified executive
officers. The plaintiff argued that the standard should not be whether the
defendant performed the duties of an officer of that particular corporation
as contained in the by-laws but rather, whether or not he performed the
duties of an officer of any corporation. This contention was properly dis-
missed by the court as untenable, since a standard of that nature would be
so far-reaching as virtually to prohibit short term security transactions by
those performing any executive functions for a corporation, a result not
within the purview of the Securities Exchange Act. Plaintiff further argued
that defendant's position as an insider gave him such access to special
knowledge of the corporation's affairs as to render him liable for profits
resulting from short-swing transactions even though defendant was not an
officer specified by the statute. The validity of this argument is not easily
determined, for almost every decision involving Section 16(b) has held
that the purpose of the section was to protect stockholders from the unfair
use of information by insiders.4 Plaintiff's implication is that through re-
peated judicial use of the term "insider," a new standard has evolved by which
profits made in short-swing transactions by "insiders," i.e., persons with
1. 48 STAT. 896 § 16(b), 1S U. S. C. § 78p(b) (1934).
2. 48 STAT. 882 § 3(b), 15 U. S. C. § 78(b) (1934).
3. Rule X-3B-2, Exchange Act Release 1 (1934).
4. Shaw v. Dreyfuss, 172 F.2d 1440 (C. A.2d 1949), cert. denied, 69 Sup. Ct.
1048; Park and Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (C. C. A.2d 1947); Smolowe v.
Delendo Corporation, 136 F.2d 231 (C. C. A.2d 1943); Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F.
Supp. 387 (S. D. N. Y. 1949) ; Rubin and Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions upon Unfair
Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. oF PA. L. REv. 468 (1946) ; Tracy
and MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MIcH. L, Ray. 1025 (1934).
CASES NOTED
access to special information by virtue of their relationship with the issuer of
the securities, shall inure to the corporation even though such person is not
specified by the statute. The court dismissed this argument by stating that
it was the intention of Congress to limit the applicability of the provisions
of Section 16(b) to the persons specified in the section.
In the instant case Section 16(b) is construed as setting up an objective
standard of liability which requires no showing of actual unfair use of
inside information. 5 This is in conformity with previous decisions under the
section which have enforced its provisions almost harshly,8 yet have refused to
extend its scope. t It might be contended that under this narrow interpreta-
tion of the scope of the statute, persons holding positions comparable to,
but not corresponding with those of the designated officers of a corporation,
would be enabled to make unfair use of inside information. But, it is equally
true that a stenographer or file clerk in a key position in the company's employ
could also be considered an "insider." Furthermore, an assistant secretary
or treasurer might perform important executive functions and yet not have
access to inside information. However, it cannot be denied that here the
defendant's important position and access to inside information in the corpora-
tion, accentuates a great danger to outside stockholders. This danger should
be dealt with by legislative action designed to clearly outline the status of all
corporate employees and prevent a multiplicity of suits. A suggested legislative
remedy for this dilemma would be inclusion of all corporate employees within
such an act. The court appears to have followed the intent of the section in
limiting liability to designated officers, since the strict and objective standards
of the Act would create undue hardship upon anyone-not manifestly within
its scope.
COURTS-INHERENT POWER OF THE FLORIDA
SUPREME COURT TO INTEGRATE THE BAR
Petitioner, the Florida State Bar Association, prayed for a rule
integrating the Florida Bar. This rule would require every practicing
attorney in the State of Florida to belong to the integrated bar, pay a
5. Accord, Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, supra.
6. Smolowe v. Delendo Corporation, supra (the court ruled that profits should be
-determined by the lowest-in, highest-out rule, rather than the first-in, first-out method
used in tax computations). Similarly the courts have attempted to encourage the bringing
of suits by minority stockholders, as in Park and Tilford v. Schulte, supra; Twentieth
Century Fox-Film Corp. v. Jenkins, 7 F. R. D. 197 (S. D. N. Y. 1947) (these cases
held that intervention by minority stockholders was allowable to offset possibility of
collusion between an influential defendant and a plaintiff corporation); Smolowe v.
Dele ndo Corporation, supra (where attorney's fees far in excess of plaintiff's actual
interest were allowed).
7. Shaw v. Dreyfuss, supra; Truncale v. Blumberg, supra (in these cases the
courts declined to call a bona fide gift a "sale" within the meaning of the statute).
Section 3(a) of the Act reveals that it was within their discretion to do so, 48 STAT.
882 § 3(a) (14), 15 U. S. C. § 78(a) (14) (1934).
